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Abstract
The paper tests the applicability of quadratic modelling in the estimation of the relationship
between corruption and economic growth. The main finding is that non-linearity holds, implying
that there is a growth maximizing level of corruption so that the initially positive marginal effect
of corruption on growth turns detrimental after the threshold level. Furthermore, the nexus
between corruption and growth is found to vary between country groups, and to be conditional
on the quality of political institutions. Low institutional quality makes the impact of corruption on
growth unambiguously positive, whereas the impact remains statistically insignificant in the regime
of high institutional quality. Thus, the results contradict with those of e.g. Aidt et al., 2008.
JEL classification: D73, H10, O57
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1 Introduction
The common wisdom is that corruption is to be univocally doomed. Still, corruption flourishes all
over the world. Even more disturbingly, the economic literature on corruption entails an
unresolved debate concerning the macroeconomic effects of corruption: some studies find
corruption purely detrimental, while some argue that corruption helps to “grease the wheels” of
the economy (Popov, 2015, provides an up-to-date summary).
In the literature, most of the studies approach the question from the viewpoint of linear
relationship between corruption and macroeconomic variables, such as economic growth or
investments. Yet, many existing studies juggle the idea that both the dependent and explanatory
variables are sensitive to the quality of political institutions. A usual premise is that better
governance enhances growth and welfare, and Leff (1964), Myrdal (1968), Kurer (1993), and
Kaufmann et al. (2000) state that corruption endogenously leads to poor governance and
exacerbates the distortions. This is to say that the effect of corruption on economic development
is likely to be conditional on political institutions. As Treisman (2000) sums up, corruption is
actually a very complex phenomenon.
It is quite plausible that the mapping of, say, the corruption-growth link is not linear. However,
very few papers have attempted to explore the non-monotonic relationship between corruption
and growth in spite of the fact that the intertwined relationship of corruption and growth should
quite naturally call for non-linear econometric modelling. Recent examples include Méon & Sekkat,
2005; Méndez & Sepúlveda, 2006; Aidt et al., 2008; and Kéïta & Laurila, 2016a; 2016b.
Méon & Sekkat (2005), and Kéïta & Laurila (2016a; 2016b) approach the non-linearity issue by
using interaction terms between corruption and governance variables in testing the Grease in the
wheels hypothesis against the Sand in the wheels hypothesis. Méon & Sekkat (2005) proves the latter
claim by finding that corruption dampens growth and investments, and that the negative effects
are particularly strong with certain deficiencies in the quality of governance. Thus, corruption is
found to exacerbate the distortions caused by bad governance. In contrast, Kéïta & Laurila (2016a)
manages to confirm the Grease in the wheels argument of Bardhan (1997) saying that, in a second-
best world of many developing countries, corruption may significantly alleviate the deeply rooted
distortions provoked by bad governance.
Méndez & Sepúlveda (2006) approach the issue by using a quadratic model to estimate the effect
of corruption on growth according to different regimes of political freedom. The main finding is
that there exists a growth-maximizing level of corruption so that corruption has a positive effect
on long run growth in countries with low degree of political freedom, while the opposite holds in
countries with high political freedom. Yet, the results are robust only in the latter sub-sample. Aidt
et al. (2008) presents another non-linear model that allows for threshold effects, and manages to
yield robust results. The results corroborate the argument that corruption hampers economic
growth in countries with high quality institutions, but contradict the reversed claim: corruption is
found to have no effects on growth in countries with low quality institutions.
This assesses the possibility of a non-linear relationship between corruption and economic growth.
The first issue is to test the empirical applicability of a quadratic regression model. In this respect,
the non-monotonic estimations of Méndez & Sepúlveda (2006), and Aidt et al. (2008) are
particularly scrutinized. Based on data from 117 countries worldwide over 1970-2011, the analysis
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finds a statistically significant pattern of growth-maximizing corruption. Second, possible
dependency of the pattern on country specific factors, and particularly on the role of institutional
quality in determining this non-linear link is studied. The result is that, in countries with low degree
of institutional quality, the effect of corruption on economic growth is positive and statistically
significant, and the threshold of optimal corruption is relatively high. On the other hand, in
countries with high quality of political institutions, optimal corruption rather minimizes than
maximizes growth at a relatively low threshold level, but the result remains statistically insignificant.
The findings somewhat match the results of Méndez & Sepúlveda (2006), but are quite opposite
to those of Aidt et al. (2008).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the methodology and data used in the
estimations. Section 3 presents and discusses the results, including basic estimations and threshold
tests over the whole sample, calculations of optimal corruption, assessment of optimality within
different country groups, and a study on the role of institutional quality on the results. Section 4
concludes.
2 Modelling, data, and methods
	
To test the existence of GDP-maximizing corruption, the paper estimates a quadratic bivariate
equation, which is commonly used for investigating a relationship that is supposed to be non-linear.
In the estimations, all the statistics are expressed in natural logarithms to make the data conform
more closely to normal distribution. It helps in correcting for skewed data, thus improving the
quality of the estimations. The baseline model reads
(1) ΔlogGDPi,t = γ+λlogCorruptioni,t+ψlogCorruptioni,t2+ζlogΩi,t+µi,t,
where the dependent variable on the left-hand side stands for the changes in GDP starting from
the initial year 1970 (that is ΔlogGDPi,t= logGDPi,t - logGDPi,1970).  The GDP data come from Penn
World Tables 8.1 (Feenstra et al., 2015), and describe the expenditure-side real GDP (at chained
PPPs in millions 2005 US$) from 117 countries worldwide for 1970–2011 (including 42 time
periods). Countries in the sample are listed in Appendix 1.
On the right-hand side of equation (1), the explanatory variable Corruptioni,t  is measured by two
indicators. The first one is the Control of Corruption index from the World Bank’s Worldwide
Governance Indicators 2014 dataset. It is denoted cc, and it covers periods 1996-2013, excluding
years 1997, 1999, and 2001. The original cc scores vary from -2.5 (utmost corruption) to 2.5 (perfect
integrity). The second indicator is the Corruption Perception Index (denoted cpi), which has been
published yearly by Transparency International since 1995.
The original cpi scores  vary  from  0  (utmost  corruption)  to  10  (perfect  integrity).  For  ease  of
interpretation both variables are rescaled to make cc vary from 1 to 6, and cpi from 1 to 11 so that
the lower end implies perfect integrity and the upper bound implies utmost corruption for both
indices. The log-transformation of course modifies these numbers again (for example, the cc index
becomes to vary from 0 to 1.79 as corruption increases).
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On the right-hand side of equation (1), Ω	 is a vector of the other control variables including
determinants of growth, and dummy variables. The most likely variables that explain growth (see
Levine & Renelt, 1992) include initial income, physical capital, human capital, and demography.
The inclusion of initial income y1970 (expenditure-side real GDP at chained PPPs in 1970, in millions
2005 US$) is supposed to catch the well-known conditional convergence hypothesis (Barro, 1991;
Mankiw & Weil, 1992). This variable should be negatively correlated with GDP growth (that is
ζ<0) suggesting that poorer countries will catch up the richer ones, as their economies grow more
rapidly through the application of new technologies, by mimicking organizational patterns etc. In
contrast, human and physical capital are commonly known for their positive influence on growth
(i.e. ζ>0). Human capital is monitored by Human capital index/person based on schooling years (Barro
& Lee, 2013) and returns to education (Psacharopoulos, 1994) Physical capital is measured by
Average capital stock, and the demographic factor is measured by Population growth, both from the Penn
World Tables 8.1. All indices are available over 1970–2011. The descriptive statistics of the main
variables are in Appendix 2.
The dummy variables in vector Ω include Post2000, Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America - Caribbean,
Middle East - North Africa1, Euro area, and Emerging/Developing Asia. The Post2000 dummy gets the
value 1 for years 2000–2011, and 0 for 1970–1999. This is reasoned by the strong anti-corruption
actions taken by the international community in the 21st century with plausible influences on the
link between corruption and economic growth. The country grouping reflected by the other five
dummy variables is reasoned by the assumption that differences in governance patterns and socio-
economics mentalities are likely to influence the corruption-growth link. The grouping follows the
World Economic Outlook Database, October 2015 (IMF). Belonging to a particular group means that the
respective dummy gets the value 1 for the country in question.
A somewhat troublesome fact is that the corruption statistics start from 1996 for cc and from 1995
for cpi, while the other data range from 1970 to 2011. Following Méndez & Sepúlveda (2006), full
use of the time series is made possible by writing out the missing corruption variable series.  This
is done by supplementing the averages of cc and cpi from their existing series (that 1995-2011 for
cpi, and 996-2011 for cc) for the blanc years (between 1970-1994 for cpi, and between 1970-1995
for cc). Then, the regressions are carried out over 1970-2011 so that the corruption indices vary
only between 1995/1996-2011.2
The estimations are based on the Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) method to avoid potential
reverse causality from GDP fluctuation to corruption. The nexus between changes in GDP and
corruption might occur, if economic downturns further encourage initially high corruption (Mauro,
1995).  All  regressors  are  also  used  as  instruments.  If  the  estimations  of  equation  (1)  would  be
conclusive regarding the significance of the quadratic form, the relationship between growth and
corruption could be illustrated by a parabolic curve. Thus, the optimum, i.e. the growth maximizing
																																																								
1 In line with World Economic Outlook Database, the Middle East - North Africa group includes Pakistan.
2 The procedure seems to suggest that the effect of changes in corruption are irrelevant, and to hide possible long run
changes in corruption. However, the validity of the use of average indices was tested by regressing separately over the
intervals 1970-1994/1995 (with constant cpi and cc values), and 1995/1996-2011 (with changing cpi and cc values), and
the results turned out quite similar. Furthermore, the ADF test over the interval 1995/1996-2011 showed that there is
no significant trend in corruption in that time span, and a plausible assumption is that there would have not been such
trend during 1970-1994/1995, or 1970-2011 for that matter. Thus, the averaging technique should be reasonably
reliable.
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or minimizing value of the corruption variable, denoted cc*, and cpi*, can be calibrated (ref. Méndez
& Sepúlveda, 2006). In the case of a maximum, marginal increases in corruption foster economic
growth up to a certain point, after which further increases of corruption lead to a decline of growth.
Thus, the illustrative curve is inverse U-shaped. Consequently, the curve is U-shaped in the case of
a minimum.
The cc*, and cpi* values can be calculated from the estimates of equation (1). However, since
equation (1) includes a set of other control variables besides the corruption variable, the calculation
might not be accurate. By Levine & Renelt (1992), it is better to focus only on the variable of main
interest. Hence, the vector of other explanatory variables, Ω, is excluded, and the calculations of
cc*, and cpi*are based on the following equation:
(1’) ΔlogGDPi,t = γ+λlogCorruptioni,t+ψlogCorruptioni,t2+µi,t.
The existence of cc*, or cpi*, is tested by the threshold approach developed by Hansen (1996; 2000).
The threshold model can be specified by the following equations:
(2) ΔlogGDPi,t = γ+βXi,t+ρThreshold1i,t+µi,t,
(3) ΔlogGDPi,t = γ+βXi,t+τThreshold2i,t+µi,t.
	
In equations (2) and (3), Xi,t is a vector of all explanatory variables used in equation (1). Considering
the case of a possible maximum, Threshold1 in equation (2) is a dummy variable that takes the value
1, if the corruption level is equal or smaller than the GDP-maximizing corruption threshold (i.e. cc,
cpi ≤ cc*, cpi*), and 0 otherwise. Recalling that the corruption indices are rescaled so that bigger
values mean higher corruption, the dummy captures countries with relatively low levels of
corruption. Thus, the estimated coefficient of Threshold1 is expected to be positive (ρ>0), because
increases in corruption before the optimum stimulate growth. On the other hand, Threshold2 gets
the value 1, if the corruption level exceeds the GDP-maximizing corruption threshold (i.e. cc, cpi >
cc*, cpi*), and 0 otherwise. Thus, the observations should be on the falling regime of the inverse U
type curve, and the estimated coefficient of Threshold2 should be negative (τ<0), or insignificant. In
the case of a possible minimum, all the above definitions are reversed.
3 Results
	
3.1 Basic estimations
	
The basic estimations include four types of regressions. On one hand, both corruption variables cc
and cpi are used, and on the other hand, equation (1) is estimated in linear (i.e. ψ=0 by assumption)
and quadratic (i.e. ψ≠0) forms in order to assess the non-linearity presumption. In Table 1 below,
regressions 1 and 2 are based on cc, while regressions 3 and 4 use cpi. Preliminary regressions 1 and
3 concern the linear form of equation (1), while regressions 2 and 4 concern the full quadratic form.
	 5
Table 1: Basic estimations of the sources of GDP growth over 1970–2011
Corruption index
Regression
cc cpi
1 2 3 4
Corruption 0.245***
(0.025)
0.621***
(0.083)
0.209***
(0.019)
0.353***
(0.087)
Corruption2 -0.226***
(0.047)
-0.054.
(0.032)
y1970 -0.559***
(0.013)
-0.548***
(0.013)
-0.546***
(0.013)
-0.544***
(0.013)
Average capital stock 0.511***
(0.013)
0.500***
(0.013)
0.498***
(0.013)
0.496***
(0.013)
Human capital index/person 0.534***
(0.038)
0.484***
(0.040)
0.495***
(0.038)
0.474***
(0.040)
Population growth -1.332e-05
(1.08e-04)
-0.3e-06
(1.0e-04)
-3.726e-05
(1.03e-04)
-3e-05
(1.0e-04)
Post 2000 0.746***
(0.016)
0.756***
(0.016)
0.813***
(0.016)
0.818***
(0.016)
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.068*
(0.029)
0.063*
(0.029)
0.085**
(0.028)
0.084**
(0.028)
Latin America - Caribbean -0.042.
(0.025)
-0.044.
(0.024)
-0.062*
(0.024)
-0.061*
(0.024)
Middle East - North Africa 0.262***
(0.028)
0.252***
(0.028)
0.275***
(0.028)
0.271***
(0.028)
Euro area -0.175***
(0.023)
-0.198***
(0.024)
-0.186***
(0.022)
-0.196***
(0.023)
Emerging/Developing Asia 0.094***
(0.027)
0.098***
(0.027)
0.087***
(0.027)
0.091***
(0.027)
Intercept -0.435***
(0.066)
-0.479***
(0.067)
-0.510***
(0.069)
-0.558***
(0.074)
Adjusted R-squared 0.5788 0.5809 0.6199 0.6200
Wald-statistic 555.5 513.6 604.5 554.6
Probability (Wald-statistic) <2.2e-16 <2.2e-16 <2.2e-16 <2.2e-16
Notes: Robust standard errors of the 2SLS estimator are reported in parentheses. The superscripts ***, **, *, and . mark the
statistical significance at 0.1, 1, 5, and 10 per cent level, respectively.
Table 1 shows that the findings are quite similar whether the estimations are based on cc or cpi. The
signs of the coefficients of the explanatory variables are almost identical in both cases, which
reflects certain robustness of the results. With both cc and cpi, the results show that corruption is
positively associated with the changes in real GDP. The estimated coefficients of corruption are
also statistically significant. In the non-linear regressions (2 and 4), the estimated coefficients of
corruption are 0.621 for cc, and 0.353	for cpi. The same positive relationship is reflected in the linear
regressions (1 and 3). Thus, corruption seems to unambiguously foster real GDP growth. In
particular, the negative coefficients of the quadratic term suggest (with 5 %, and 10 % error level
for cc and cpi, respectively) that there exists a critical, growth maximizing level of corruption.	
Overall, the growth control variables contained in Ω stay consistent with the literature by displaying
their expected signs (Levine & Renelt, 1992). The estimated coefficients are statistically significant
except that of Population growth. The negative sign of the estimated coefficient of initial income y1970
consistently validates the conditional convergence hypothesis (Mankiw & Weil, 1992). The estimated
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coefficients of Average capital stock and Human capital index/person are positive, confirming the
contribution of human and physical capital to economic performance (Levine & Renelt, 1992).
Furthermore, the results in Table 1 show that the dummy variables are meaningful. For example,
the estimated coefficient Post2000 is systematically positive suggesting that the recent anti-
corruption mobilization has significantly enforced GDP growth. The same is true with the country-
group dummy variables. For example in Sub-Saharan Africa, the estimated coefficients are always
positive implying that, as such, belonging to this country group has a positive effect on growth.
3.2 Optimal corruption
	
Taking cc as the benchmark corruption index, the estimated coefficient in regression 2 in Table 1
above indicates that a one percentage point increase in Corruption produces a 0.62 per cent increase
in  ΔlogGDP. Moreover, that the estimated coefficient of Corruption2 is negative and significant
implies that the results can be used to obtain the optimal corruption level. Estimation of equation
(1’) yields ΔlogGDP = 0.3633+1.3364*cc-0.7578*cc2, where cc is  used  for Corruption. The optimal
level of corruption cc* is solved by maximizing the equation at ΔlogGDP=0. As a result, cc* = 0.88,
and ΔlogGDP =0.95. Figure 1 illustrates the result.
Figure 1: Estimating the optimal corruption threshold
Figure 1 plots an inverse U-type curve whose maximum is defined by the coordinates 0.88 and 0.95.
From the full scale of logcc that is [0;1.79], corruption tends to stimulate growth within the range
[0;0.88). Thus, corruption acts as grease in economic wheels. Once the maximum is reached,
corruption becomes harmful, and further increases in corruption hinder economic growth. In other
words, in the range beyond the optimal corruption level that is (0.88;1.79], corruption starts to sand
the wheels of the economy. Appendix 3 checks the robustness of the results yielded by the
quadratic functional form.
The existence of cc* is tested using the Hansen approach (Hansen, 1996, 2000). Table 2 reports the
estimation results of equations (2) and (3). Since the estimates are overall consistent with those in
Table 1, attention is here paid only on those relevant to the Hansen test.
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Table 2: Testing the presence of the growth maximizing corruption threshold over 1970–2011
The Hansen test aims to verify if there exists a GDP growth pattern, when observed corruption is
below cc*=0.88 (regression 5 in Table 2), and if there are any signs of economic downturn when
observed corruption is above cc*=0.88 (regression 6 in Table 2). The result of this test depends on
the signs of the estimated coefficients of the Threshold variables. In regression 5, the estimated
coefficient of Threshold1 is positive (ρ>0), while that of Threshold2 is negative (τ<0) in regression 6.
Corruption index cc
Regression 5 6 7 8 9 10
cc 0.594***
(0.095)
0.594***
(0.095)
0.795***
(0.126)
0.552***
(0.087)
0.862***
(0.140)
0.604***
(0.088)
cc2 -0.213***
(0.049)
-0.213***
(0.049)
-0.292***
(0.059)
-0.232***
(0.051)
-0.321***
(0.064)
-0.253***
(0.055)
y1970 -0.539***
(0.014)
-0.539***
(0.014)
-0.538***
(0.014)
-0.535***
(0.014)
-0.535***
(0.014)
-0.537***
(0.014)
Average capital stock 0.492***
(0.014)
0.492***
(0.014)
0.491***
(0.013)
0.488***
(0.014)
0.489***
(0.013)
0.491***
(0.013)
Human capital index/person 0.455***
(0.040)
0.455***
(0.040)
0.453***
(0.040)
0.448***
(0.040)
0.462***
(0.040)
0.457***
(0.040)
Population growth -1.17e-05
(1.10e-04)
-1.17e-05
(1.10e-04)
-1.23e-05
(1.09e-04)
-1.25e-05
(1.10e-04)
-1.13e-05
(1.09e-04)
-1.17e-05
(1.09e-04)
Post 2000 0.762***
(0.016)
0.762***
(0.016)
0.763***
(0.016)
0.764***
(0.016)
0.761***
(0.016)
0.762***
(0.016)
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.069*
(0.030)
0.069*
(0.030)
0.070*
(0.030)
0.065*
(0.030)
0.072*
(0.030)
0.067*
(0.030)
Latin America – Caribbean -0.022
(0.026)
-0.022
(0.026)
-0.016
(0.026)
-0.022
(0.026)
-0.018
(0.026)
-0.028
(0.026)
Middle East-North Africa 0.274***
(0.030)
0.274***
(0.030)
0.277***
(0.030)
0.270***
(0.030)
0.277***
(0.030)
0.271***
(0.030)
Euro area -0.187***
(0.025)
-0.187***
(0.025)
-0.179***
(0.024)
-0.176***
(0.025)
-0.176***
(0.025)
-0.179***
(0.025)
Emerging/Developing Asia 0.124***
(0.029)
0.124***
(0.029)
0.127***
(0.029)
0.121***
(0.029)
0.126***
(0.029)
0.120***
(0.029)
Threshold 1 0.021
(0.038)
Threshold 2 -0.021
(0.038)
Threshold 1.1 0.105*
(0.044)
Threshold 2.1 0.058
(0.035)
Threshold 1.2 0.126**
(0.048)
Threshold 2.2 0.050
(0.030)
Intercept -0.463***
(0.083)
-0.441***
(0.068)
-0.584***
(0.091)
-0.417***
(0.069)
-0.630***
(0.100)
-0.447***
(0.068)
Adjusted R-squared 0.5819 0.5819 0.5823 0.5821 0.5824 0.5821
Wald-statistic 452.5 452.5 453.5 453 453.7 453
Probability (Wald statistic) <2.2e-16 <2.2e-16 <2.2e-16 <2.2e-16 <2.2e-16 <2.2e-16
Notes: Robust standard errors of the 2SLS estimator are in parentheses. The superscripts ***, **, *, and . represent statistical
significance at 0.1, 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively.
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The signs are consistent with the existence of a maximum at cc*=0.88, but neither of the estimates
is statistically significant. Therefore, two additional experiments are carried out by exploring the
close neighbourhood of cc=0.88 with the presumption that the odds of cc* residing within the
neighbourhood would be improved. The first experiment reported in Table 2 considers a 0.4 logcc
wide neighbourhood around cc=0.88, i.e. . The dummy variable Threshold1.1 gets
the value 1 if cc is equal to or below 0.68 (and 0 otherwise), while Threshold2.1 gets 1 if cc is equal to
or above 1.08 (and 0 otherwise). Regression 7 in Table 2 yields a positive and statistically significant
(at 5 % level) coefficient estimate for Threshold1.1,  and  regression  8  yields  now  a  positive  but
insignificant estimate for Threshold2.1. The second experiment expands the neighbourhood further
to 0.6, i.e. 	with respective	dummies Threshold1.2 and Threshold2.2. The coefficient
estimate for Threshold1.2 from regression 9 is consistent with that of Threshold1.1 (the positive
marginal effect is even stronger, and the degree of statistical significance is better). However, the
coefficient estimate for Threshold2.2 from regression 10 remains positive and insignificant. In any
case, the experiments are statistically robust, and suffice to confirm the existence of an optimal
corruption level in the close neighbourhood of cc=0.88.
3.3 Optimal corruption according to country groups
	
The results presented in Table 1 and Table 2 hint that there may be differences in the non-linear
correlation between corruption and GDP growth between the specified country groups. As
presumed, there should exist considerable variation in socioeconomic, political, moral or other
such characteristics that may affect the realization of the threshold of optimal corruption.
Therefore, the applicability of the quadratic formulation is worthy of testing also from this point
of view. In particular, the test focuses on if the relationship between corruption and economic
growth plots a U-shaped curve, and whether that curve is inversed or not. In other words, the test
is about finding a growth maximizing or growth minimizing level of corruption.
In the test, equation (1’) is estimated using the country groupings specified above. The estimation
method remains otherwise unaltered so that the results should be consistent with those presented
in Table 1 and Table 2. The results yielded by the testing procedure are reported in Table 3.
Table 3: Testing for the presence of an optimal cc* according to country groups
Country groups
cc coefficient cc2 coefficient cc*
Sub-Saharan Africa -12.087***
(1.816)
3.895***
(0.703)
1.551
Latin America - Caribbean 1.952
(1.283)
-0.638
(0.592)
1.529
Middle East-North Africa 0.698
(1.678)
-0.484
(0.664)
0.721
Euro area 0.417
(0.257)
-0.194
(0.192)
1.074
Emerging/Developing Asia 13.482**
(4.140)
-5.421***
(1.562)
1.243
Notes: Robust standard errors of 2SLS estimator are in parentheses. The superscripts ***, and ** represent
statistical significance at 0.1, and 1 % level, respectively.
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Table 3 shows that the test result is statistically significant only for Emerging/Developing Asia and Sub-
Saharan Africa. In Emerging/Developing Asia countries, the corruption-to-growth relationship plots
an inverse U-shaped curve just like in the case of the whole sample of countries illustrated in Figure
1 above. The growth maximizing level of corruption is cc*=1.243 saying that grease in the economic
wheels turns to sand at that point. In Sub-Saharan Africa, however, the plotting is U-shaped with
cc*=1.551 as the growth minimizing level of corruption. This is to say that when the observed level
of corruption is lower than 1.551, further increases in corruption sands the economic wheels, but
when corruption is beyond this threshold, corruption starts to grease the wheels. The result sounds
surprising, but it merely reflects the fact that corruption is particularly severe in that country group.
For Latin America - Caribbean, Middle  East  -  North  Africa, or Euro area,  the  test  suggests  growth
maximizing optima, but the estimates are not statistically significant. Figure 2 illustrates the results.
Figure 2: Estimating the optimal GDP-maximizing corruption threshold by country groups
In Figure  2, the shapes of the curves give reasons to believe that GDP-maximizing corruption
thresholds should exist in all country groups besides Sub-Saharan Africa. The insignificant findings
for Latin America - Caribbean, Middle East - North Africa, or Euro area, in Table 3 are reflected by the
generally very flat curvatures of the respective inverse U-shaped plotter outputs, which indicates
low elasticity of GDP growth to increases in corruption.
	
3.4 The influence of institutional regimes
	
Earlier investigations on the macroeconomic effects of corruption suggest that the interplay
between corruption and governance determines the effects in large extent. Corruption is found to
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have positive economic impacts in countries with deficient political institutions or poor
governance, and negative or less positive elsewhere (Méon & Sekkat, 2005; Méndez & Sepúlveda,
2006; Méon & Weill, 2008; Kéïta & Laurila, 2016b).
Based on the above findings on the non-linear relationship between corruption and economic
growth, the next step is to examine whether institutional quality can affect the long-run link, and
the calibrated thresholds of optimal corruption. To capture the institutional factor, the indicators
Safety and Rule of law, and Government effectiveness from the world Bank’s WGI dataset are used (see
Kéïta & Laurila, 2016a). Safety and Rule of law assesses the “perceptions of the extent to which agents
have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract
enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and
violence.” On the other hand, Government effectiveness “reflects perceptions of the quality of public
services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures,
the quality if policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government’s
commitment to such policies” (see Kaufmann et al., 2010). The indicators are available from 1996.
Countries are sorted according to institutional quality (from low to high quality) measured by the
observed values of the two indicators, and divided into three groups, each consisting of 39
countries. The quality measurement is again supplemented by calculating the average values of
Safety and Rule of law and	Government effectiveness indicators over	1996–2011, and using the averages
for the missing observations over 1970-2011. The grouping is supposed to represent three types
of regimes of institutional quality. In order to make analytical difference, the middle regime 2 is
dropped out. The list of countries in the remaining regimes 1 and 3 is presented in Appendix 4).
Then, equation (1’) is estimated with respect to regime 1 (poorest institutional quality), and regime
3 (best institutional quality) over the whole time span 1970-2011. The robustness of the results is
checked by doing the same over 1996–2011 that is by using only the observed indicator values.
The results are reported in Table 4.
Table 4: Growth maximizing corruption levels with respect to institutional quality
Time span 1970–2011 1996–2011
Regime
cc cc2 cc* cc cc2 cc*
Safety and Rule
of law
1 20.955***
(4.751)
-7.763***
(1.649)
1.349 23.589***
(5.896)
-8.868***
(2.051)
1.330
3 -0.380
(0.242)
0.689***
(0.187)
0.276 -0.054
(0.380)
0.585*
(0.292)
0.046
Government
effectiveness
1 8.353.
(4.915)
-3.426*
(1.701)
1.219 18.419**
(6.173)
-7.078***
(2.143)
1.301
3 -0.338
(0.208)
0.502**
(0.158)
0.336 -0.096
(0.311)
0.418.
(0.236)
0.114
Notes: Robust standard errors of 2SLS estimator are in parentheses. The superscripts ***, **, *, and . represent statistical significance
at 0.1, 1, 5, and 10 % error level, respectively.
Table 4 confirms the common view that the impact of corruption on growth is highly regime
specific. In regime1 that is with poor institutional quality, corruption has a positive impact on
growth over 1970-2011. The estimated coefficients of cc stay statistically significant (at 0.1 % error
level with Safety and Rule of law, and at 10 % error level with Government effectiveness). Over 1996-2011,
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the same conclusion prevails and the statistical significance is even higher (0.1 % level for Safety and
Rule of law and and 1 % level Government effectiveness).  This  result  is  consistent  with  Méndez  &
Sepúlveda (2006), which says that corruption tends to be beneficial to economic growth in
countries with low political freedom. Yet, Aidt et al. (2008) does not find such connection with respect
to low political accountability.
Second, in regime 3 with high institutional quality, the signs turn the other way round over the
interval 1970-2011. In particular, the estimated coefficient of cc is negative but statistically
insignificant whether Safety and Rule of law or Government effectiveness is concerned. This means that
corruption has no obvious impact on economic performance in this regime. The result stays robust
even when the shorter time span 1996-2011 is considered, and contradicts Aidt et al. (2008), which
finds corruption substantially detrimental to growth in the high quality context.3
Third, beyond the conclusion that the effects of corruption on growth are conditional on
institutional quality, the results in Table 4 suggest that cc* is also correlated with the quality regimes.
The cc* values are relatively high in regime 1, while they are relatively low in regime 3. Thus, the
growth maximizing threshold seems to vary in reverse order with institutional quality. The finding
is also robust, because the estimations over both time spans 1970-2011, and 1996-2011 yield similar
results. Figure 3 illustrates the results with respect to the quality regimes constructed according to
Safety and Rule of law and Government effectiveness. The regimes under consideration are indicated by
numbers 1 and 3 after the respective indicator titles.
Figure 3: Optimal corruption with respect to institutional quality (1970-2011)
In Figure 3, regime 1 shows inverse U-shaped curves with growth maximizing cc* values. On the
other end, the curves in regime 3 are U-shaped, which would say that the cc* values minimize GDP
growth. However, since the estimates are statistically insignificant, the test remains inconclusive.
																																																								3	Yet, note that Aidt et al. (2008) uses other quality measures and a more restricted sub-sample.
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Nevertheless, there is some support to the idea that corruption hampers economic growth in the
high quality regime, as claimed by Méndez & Sepúlveda (2006) and Aidt et al. (2008).
4 Conclusions
This study is an empirical analysis that tests the non-linear relationship between corruption and
real GDP changes. The test, including the Hansen threshold technique (Hansen, 1996; 2000), is
performed through the estimation of a long run bivariate quadratic function over 117 countries
worldwide within the time span from 1970 to 2011. The econometric technique is 2SLS, which
helps to correct potential reverse causality from growth to corruption.
The main results indicate that the corruption-growth nexus is indeed non-linear. Thus, there also
exists a GDP growth maximizing corruption threshold over the whole sample of countries. Within
a logarithmic variation interval (from 0 to 1.79, where the upper bound means utmost corruption),
the growth maximizing corruption threshold is found to be 0.88 within the sample. This implies
that the marginal effect of corruption on growth is positive, if perceived corruption is below the
threshold level, and turns negative beyond that threshold. The relationship plots an inverse U-
shaped curve, which reaches its top at the threshold level.
The same is experimented with respect to presumed differences between the country groups sorted
out already in the basic estimations. The results are unambiguous in two groups, Emerging/Developing
Asia, and Sub-Saharan Africa, but remain statistically insignificant in Latin America - Caribbean, Middle
East - North Africa, and Euro area. In Emerging/Developing Asia, a reasonably high (cc*=1.243) growth
maximizing corruption threshold is found, but in Sub-Saharan Africa, the threshold is growth
minimizing, and very high (cc*=1.551). The results in the remaining three groups speak in favour
of growth maximization, but plot very flat inverse U-shaped curves. Overall, the results manage to
confirm non-linearity in the corruption-growth nexus.
Next, the paper proceeds to examine the role of institutional quality (measured by Safety and Rule of
law, and Government effectiveness) in the context of the model. The results are unambiguous, when
countries with low institutional quality are considered: the statistically significant finding is that the
effect of corruption on economic growth is clearly positive. Furthermore, the growth maximizing
corruption threshold is found to be high (relatively close to the upper bound 1.79). The results are
less clear among countries with high institutional quality. The effect of corruption on economic
growth turns out negative suggesting that, in this group of countries, the optimal corruption
threshold should be low (relatively close to the lower bound 0), and minimize rather that maximize
growth. However, the result remains statistically insignificant. The findings are broadly consistent
with the conclusions of Méndez & Sepúlveda (2006), but are in strict contrast with those of Aidt
et al. (2008).
In any case, the findings of this paper comport with the idea that the possible virtues of corruption
arise from pre-existing distortions caused by bad governance. To some extent, corruption can
alleviate malfunctions that are rooted deeply in governmental practices. What makes this
particularly disturbing is that, in many developing countries, corruption might be reasoned by
macroeconomic grounds. As Méndez & Sepúlveda (2006, p. 96) puts it, “public policies designed
to eliminate corruption alone might not be optimal for growth”.
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Appendix 1: List of countries/territories in the sample (117 in total)
Albania
Argentina
Australia
Austria
Bahrain
Bangladesh
Barbados
Belgium
Belize
Benin
Bolivia
Botswana
Brazil
Brunei Darussalam
Bulgaria
Burundi
Cambodia
Cameroon
Canada
Central African Rep.
Chile
China
Colombia
Congo, Republic of
Democratic Rep. of Congo
Costa Rica
Cote d’Ivoire
Cyprus
Denmark
Dominican Republic
Ecuador
Egypt
El Salvador
Fiji
Finland
France
Gabon
Gambia
Germany
Ghana
Greece
Guatemala
Honduras
Hong Kong
Hungary
Iceland
India
Indonesia
Iran
Iraq
Ireland
Israel
Italy
Jamaica
Japan
Jordan
Kenya
Korea, Republic of
Kuwait
Lao
Lesotho
Liberia
Luxembourg
Macao
Malawi
Malaysia
Maldives
Mali
Malta
Mauritania
Mauritius
Mongolia
Morocco
Mozambique
Mexico
Nepal
Niger
Namibia
Netherlands
Norway
New Zealand
Pakistan
Panama
Paraguay
Peru
Philippines
Poland
Portugal
Qatar
Romania
Rwanda
Saudi Arabia
Senegal
Sierra Leone
Singapore
South Africa
Spain
Sri Lanka
Sudan
Swaziland
Sweden
Switzerland
Syrian Arab Rep.
Taiwan
Tanzania
Thailand
Togo
Trinidad and
Tobago
Tunisia
Turkey
Uganda
United Kingdom
United States
Uruguay
Venezuela
Viet Nam
Zambia
Notes: The total sample of countries (117 countries) is used in the estimations based on cc. Central African Republic does not appear
in the estimations based on cpi, because there are no such statistics for this country.
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Appendix 2:
Table 2.1: Descriptive statistics
Minimum Median Mean Standard
deviation
Maximum
Real GDP 5.066 10.476 10.665 2.019 16.416
cc -0.089 1.317 1.143 0.397 1.715
cpi 0.000 2.002 1.770 0.489 2.361
Aggregate capital stock 4.997 11.159 11.386 2.247 17.628
Human capital index/person 0.039 0.760 0.733 0.289 1.286
Population growth -2.222 2.151 2.097 1.746 7.189
Note: The descriptive statistics are based on the natural logarithm values of the variables.
Furthermore, unit-root tests are undertaken in order to explore the time series properties of the
data. Based on the Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) test, the findings presented in Table 2.2 shows
that series are all stationary. The test results are reported over the whole period 1970-2011, but the
results are practically the same, when the true corruption data is examined over 1995/1996-2011.
This is to say that the distribution of the variables neither follows any trend nor changes over time.
Table 2.2: Results of the Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests
Variable Statistic P-value
Delta log GDP -9.3067 < 0.01
cc -9.3856 < 0.01
cpi -9.4731 < 0.01
Average capital stock -10.645 < 0.01
Human capital index/person -9.073 < 0.01
Population growth -8.8751 < 0.01
Notes: The ADF tests the null hypothesis that the series contain a
unit-root, i.e. are nonstationary. The conclusion is that the series are
stationary, because all probabilities (P-values) associated with the
Dickey-Fuller statistics are smaller than the critical value 0.05.
The same conclusion prevails when the KPSS technique is applied:
Table 2.3: Results of the KPSS test for stationarity
Variable KPSS Level KPSS Trend P-value
Delta log GDP 0.1814 0.0799 > 0.1
cc 0.2906 0.0510 > 0.1
cpi 0.0491 0.0291 > 0.1
Average capital stock 0.1667 0.0298 > 0.1
Human capital index/person 0.1129 0.1046 > 0.1
Population growth 0.0613 0.0605 > 0.1
Notes: The tests conclude that the series are stationary; all probabilities (P-values) associated
with the KPSS statistics are greater than the critical value 0.05.
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Appendix 3: Robustness checks
The investigations on the non-linear relationship between corruption and real GDP changes are
based on a quadratic function, and suggest that the optimal GDP-maximizing corruption threshold
is cc*= 0.881. Based on equation (1’), the robustness of the finding is checked by using alternative
power functions to see how sensitive the threshold is. The results are reported in Table 3.1.
Table 3.1: Optimal GDP-maximizing corruption levels with alternative power functions
Power cc coeff. cc power coeff. cc*
1.2 5.155***
(0.514)
-4.471***
(0.443)
0.819
1.4 2.767***
(0.270)
-2.121***
(0.204)
0.838
1.6 1.966***
(0.188)
-1.349***
(0.126)
0.855
1.8 1.563***
(0.148)
-0.968***
(0.088)
0.872
2 1.336***
(0.120)
-0.757***
(0.065)
0.881
2.2 1.153***
(0.107)
-0.592***
(0.052)
0.903
2.4 1.033***
(0.095)
-0.486***
(0.042)
0.916
2.6 0.941***
(0.086)
-0.407***
(0.034)
0.929
2.8 0.869***
(0.079)
-0.345***
(0.029)
0.942
3 0.785***
(0.073)
-0.290***
(0.024)
0.949
Notes: Robust standard errors of 2SLS estimators are in parentheses. The
superscript *** represents statistical significance at 0.1 % level.
Table 3.1 shows that all the estimated coefficients of the cc and ccpower terms stay statistically highly
meaningful. Moreover, the GDP-maximizing corruption level goes up as the power of the non-
linear term increases. Thus, the use of alternative functional forms does not significantly affect the
results. The relationship between corruption and GDP growth remains non-linear and
systematically translates to an inverse U-shaped curve, which is consistent with the quadratic form
around power 2. Figure 3.1 illustrates the results.
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Figure 3.1: Optimal GDP-maximizing corruption levels using alternative functional forms
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Appendix 4: Institutional quality regimes
Safety and Rule of law 1:
Iraq, Democratic Republic of Congo, Venezuela, Central African Republic, Cote d’Ivoire,
Ecuador, Sudan, Congo, Burundi, Bolivia, Cameroon, Cambodia, Liberia, Guatemala, Kenya,
Lao, Paraguay, Iran, Honduras, Sierra Leone, Nepal, Togo, Pakistan, El Salvador, Mauritania,
Bangladesh, Dominican Republic, Fiji, Argentina, Benin, Peru, Swaziland, Mexico, Philippines,
Indonesia, Mozambique, Gabon, Albania, Niger.
Safety and Rule of law 3:
Kuwait, Greece, Botswana, Uruguay, Macao, Hungary, Brunei Darussalam, Israel, Taiwan,
Mauritius, Barbados, Republic of Korea, Qatar, Portugal, Spain, Cyprus, Chile, Japan, Belgium,
France, Malta, Hong Kong, United States, Singapore, Germany, Iceland, United Kingdom,
Australia, Ireland, Switzerland, Austria, Netherlands, Canada, Luxembourg, Norway, Denmark,
New Zealand, Sweden, Finland.
Government effectiveness 1:
Democratic Republic of Congo, Central African Republic, Togo, Sudan, Liberia, Congo, Sierra
Leone, Iraq, Cote d’Ivoire, Burundi, Venezuela, Lao, Nepal, Paraguay, Cambodia, Fiji,
Mauritania, Cameroon, Zambia, Mali, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Ecuador, Gabon, Swaziland,
Guatemala, Honduras, Niger, Mongolia, Gambia, Uganda, Dominican Republic, Kenya,
Tanzania, Bolivia, Syrian Arab Republic, Iran, Benin, Mozambique.
Government effectiveness 3:
Poland, Uruguay, Greece, Hungary, Mauritius, Spain, Brunei Darussalam, Malaysia, Qatar,
Republic of Korea, Portugal, Malta, Taiwan, Chile, Israel, Macao, Ireland, Cyprus, Japan, France,
United Kingdom, United States, Barbados, Germany, Belgium, Iceland, Austria, Australia, Hong
Kong, Netherlands, Luxembourg, Canada, Norway, New Zealand, Switzerland, Sweden,
Denmark, Finland, Singapore.
